Abstract. We cryptanalyse some block cipher proposals that are based on dedicated hash functions SHA-1 and MD5. We discuss a related-key attack against SHACAL-1 and present a method for finding "slid pairs" for it. We also present simple attacks against MDC-MD5 and the Kaliski-Robshaw block cipher.
Introduction
One of the most widely used ways of creating cryptographic hash functions is the socalled Davies-Meyer mode. Let Y = E(M, X) be a compression function that takes in a message block M with an input variable X and produces a partial digest Y of equal size to X. To compute a message digest of message M 1 | M 2 | · · · | M n , we simply set X 0 to some predefined initialization vector and iterate for i = 1, 2, . . . , n:
The resulting message digest is X n . See [7, 14, 16, 17] for further discussion of hash function modes of operation. Notably, in 2002 Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton proved that this mode is secure if E is secure [3] .
It has been observed that the compression functions of most widely-used dedicated hash functions MD5 [18] and SHA [19, 20] are in fact based on this construction. In these hash functions the exclusive-or operation has been replaced by wordwise addition modulo 2 32 of the chaining variables. It has also been observed that the compression function E of MD5 and SHA can be efficiently computed in both directions; given Y = E(X, M ) and M , the original chaining value X can be recovered using an inverse transform X = E −1 (Y, M ). However, it is believed to be more difficult to recover X i−1 , given X i and M . [11] . In this proposal the message block M is viewed as the "key", the chaining variable X acts as the plaintext block and Y = E(X, M ) is the corresponding ciphertext block.
Later, a "tweak" was submitted where the original SHACAL was renamed SHACAL-1 and a new block cipher SHACAL-2 (based on SHA-256) was also proposed [12] . We refer the reader to [11, 12, 20] for detailed specifications of the SHACAL block ciphers. The basic structure is also used as a part of the HORNET stream cipher [15] .
A detailed analysis of differential and linear properties of SHA-1 in encryption mode can be found in [10] , where it is conjectured that a linear cryptanalytic attack would require at least 2 80 known plaintexts and a differential attack would require at least 2 116 chosen plaintexts.
Sliding SHA-1 and SHACAL
Slide attacks against block ciphers were introduced by Biryukov and Wagner in 1999 [4, 5] , although similar techniques had previously been used by others. To our knowledge, slide attacks against hash functions have not been previously considered in the literature. Indeed it is difficult to see if and how "slid pairs" in the compression function can be exploited to find collisions for the hash function. This remains an open question.
However, it is interesting to consider the question whether or not slid pairs (which are essentially linear relations between two inputs and outputs) can be easily found for SHA-1. This is also related to Anderson's classification of hash functions [1] . David Wagner has considered a slide attack on 40 iterations of SHA-1 in unpublished work [21] .
SHA-1 exhibits some properties which are useful when mounting slide attacks.
a) The SHA-1 compression function consists of four different "rounds". For 20 iterations of each round the nonlinear function F i and the constant K i are unchanged. There are only three transitions between different iteration types (see Figure 1 ). b) The key schedule (i.e. message expansion) can be slid. We simply choose
It is easy to see that after the key expansion
We note that these properties are not exhibited by SHA-256 (or SHA-512), thus making SHACAL-2 more resistant to slide attacks.
Related-key attacks
We shall consider the difficulty of distinguishing related keys. We assume that we are given chosen-plaintext access to two SHACAL-1 encryption oracles ("black boxes") whose keys are related in the way described in the previous section. The main question becomes how many chosen plaintexts are needed.
For the transition iterations between different types of functions we wish to find inputs that produce the same output word for both types ("round collisions"). Experiments have confirmed that the round functions behave sufficiently randomly for us to use 2 −32 as the probability of a round collision. Since there are three transitions, a simple distinguisher will require approximately 2 128 chosen plaintext pairs.
As pointed out by an anonymous program committee member, this can be improved to 2 96 by using "structures"; first perform 2 32 encryptions of (A, B, C, D, x) on the first oracle, where x = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 2 32 − 1 and A, B, C, D are some constants. Then do another 2 32 encryptions of (y, A, B ≫ 2, C, D) on the second "slid" oracle for y = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 2 32 − 1. Since each entry in the first set corresponds to some slid entry in the second set, the first collision is effectively obtained for free, and only 2 96 pairs are required to distinguish the related keys.
A version of SHACAL-1 reduced to three rounds (60 iterations) will require 2 64 pairs (only two transitions).
An Algorithm for Finding Slid Pairs
A method exists for finding slid pairs with roughly 2 32 effort. The method is rather technical, so we can only give an overview of the key ideas used.
The general strategy is as follows. The algorithm doesn't start by choosing the plaintext or the ciphertext, but from the "middle", iterations 20 and 40. We find collisions in these positions with O(1) effort and then work towards iterations 25 -28, where we perform a partial meet-in-the middle match.
Round collisions. We note that in iteration i, not all input words affect the possibility of a round collision; only B, C, and D are relevant, since A and E only affect the output word linearily. Furthermore, the key word W i has no effect to the probability of collision in iterations i or i + 1.
For iteration pair 19/20 (select-parity transition) we use:
It is easy to see that
Thus the constant (K 0 /K 20 ) is canceled out in both cases and a round collision occurs. Similarly, for iteration pair 39/40 (parity-majority transition) we use:
Again we see that a collision occurs:
1 We use the boxed plus and minus symbols ⊟ and ⊞ to denote twos complement addition and subtraction operations mod 2 32 . ⊟x can be read as 0⊟x. Other symbols denote are word-wise binary operators as follows: ¬ not, ∧ and, ∨ or, and ⊕ exclusive-or. This is a surprising property, but we are have not discovered a direct way to transform it into a practical attack against SHA-1 and SHACAL.
Block ciphers based on MD5
We may also consider block ciphers derived from other dedicated hash functions. One obvious candidate is MD5 [18] . The MD5 compression function consists of four "rounds", each of which has 16 iterations. Because each of the 64 iterations has a different constant, the MD5 compression function doesn't seem to be subject to sliding attacks. Figure 2 shows the structure of a single MD5 iteration.
The MD5 compression function is known to not be collision-resistant [8] . This indicates the existence of "fixed points" in the corresponding block cipher but doesn't really tell us much its security. Some differential cryptanalysis of the hashing mode has been attempted, but we are not aware of any cryptanalysis of MD5 in encryption mode [2] . However, there exists at least one high-probability differential characteristic: P ⊕ P ′ = 80000000 80000000 80000000 80000000 ↓ E(P, K) ⊕ E(P ′ , K) = 80000000 80000000 80000000 80000000
With probability 2 −16 this characteristic will penetrate 16 iterations of rounds 1, 2, and 4. The characteristic holds with P = 1 for round 3, yielding a total product probability of 2 −48 . Note that if the chaining variable is added, the output xor becomes zero. This attack is closely related to the collision attacks discussed in [6] .
Message Digest Cipher
The Message Digest Cipher (MDC) encryption mode for iterated hash functions was proposed by Gutmann in 1993 and is used in his Secure FileSystem software (in conjunction with the SHA-1 compression function) [9] . MDC can be defined as
Here the boxed plus symbol (⊞) denotes wordwise addition modulo 2 32 , IV is an initialization vector, P i are the plaintext blocks, and C i are the corresponding ciphertext blocks. If we ignore the addition operation, MDC is equivalent to running the compression function in CFB (cipher feedback) mode.
The decryption operation can be written as:
This allows us to select the input to the compression function. Using the differential characteristic described in the previous section, we can distinguish MDC-MD5 from a "perfect" 128-bit block cipher in CFB mode with about 2 48 blocks (2 55 bits) in a chosen ciphertext attack. Computational cost of key recovery can be substantially reduced using this, and other, differential properties of the MD5 compression function. Such attacks depend on the details of key scheduling mechanism used. 
The Kaliski-Robshaw Cipher
Another proposal based on MD5 is the Kaliski-Robshaw cipher [13] . The main purpose of the proposal apparently was to activate discussion of very large block ciphers. However, the paper gave enough details about this proposal for us to mount a cryptanalytic attack. This cipher has 8192-bit blocksize and its basic iteration is closely related to that of MD5. However, the overall structure is radically different.
It turns out that flipping bit 26 (0x04000000) of one of the 256 plaintext words will result in equivalence of at least 64 ciphertext words with experimental probability 0.096 = 2 −3.4 . This is due to the fact that this particular bit often only affects three words in first round. In each of the consequent rounds the number of affected words only can only quadruple, resulting 3 * 4 * 4 * 4 = 192 affected words in the end, and leaving 64 words untouched.
This immediately leads to a distinguisher requiring no more than dozen chosen plaintext blocks. Analysis of key recovery attacks is made a little bit more difficult by the sketchy nature of the description of key schedule. If we assume that the key can be effectively recovered from permutation P, we believe that a key recovery attack will not require more than 2 16 chosen plaintext blocks and neglible computational effort.
Conclusions
We have presented attacks against block ciphers that have been directly derived from dedicated hash functions. Section 2 discusses slide attacks against SHA-1 and SHACAL-1 and section 3 describes simple attacks against MDC-MD5 and the Kaliski-Robshaw cipher.
Compression functions are meant to be only ran in one direction. The security properties of compression functions can be different when ran in the opposite direction ("decryption"). Furthermore a key-scheduling mechanism suitable for a dedicated hash function may be insufficient for a block cipher.
Based on evidence in hand, we assert that since the design criteria of compression functions and block ciphers are radically different, adaptation of even a secure compression function as a block cipher is often not a wise thing to do.
